

# Identifying Risks in Auction Design: Investors' and Policy Makers Perspectives in Chile

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#### **Presentation Outline**

- Introduction & A little bit of history
- Early auctions, the transition & new auctions
- Research objectives & Methodology
- Initial results
- Discussion



#### Introduction

- Electricity auction is a widely used mechanism worldwide to allocate electricity demand based on competitive bids
- The auction mechanism has been used to steer the energy matrix development toward efficiency and public policy objectives



## A little bit of history

- Chile pioneered the deregulation of the electricity sector in 1982, establishing a market in generation and monopolies in transmission & distribution.
  - A spot price market was set up for the transactions among generators
  - Discos purchased energy at "bus price", calculated by the government every six months.
  - The bus price was supposed to reflect an average of the spot price in time.



## A little bit of history

 In 2005, the government established auctions as the mechanism to assign the long term supply of energy and capacity to distribution companies.



## **Early Auctions**

 Between 2006 & 2015 the results of the auction processed were not promising

	Average Price	Price Ceiling	Auctioned	Awarded	Awarded
Process	(\$/MWh)	(\$/MWh)	Energy (GWh)	Energy (GWh)	Percentage
2006/01	52,91	62,69	13568	12076	89%
2006/01-2	54,55	62,69	1130	1130	100%
2006/02	59,77	61,68	14615	5700	39%
2006/02-2	65,8	71,06	9000	1800	20%
2008/01	104,31	125,16	8788	7821	89%
2008/01-2	99,49	125,16	935	935	100%
2010/01	90,3	92,04	2696	2200	82%
2012/01	129,45	129,5	924	924	100%
2012/01-2	138,9	140	1650	248	15%
2013/01	128,93	129	5000	3900	78%
Total			58306	36733	63%



## **Early Auctions**

- Between 2006 & 2015 the results of the auction processed were not promising
  - 94% of the energy was awarded to the 3 main incumbent companies (Endesa, Colbún & AES Gener) and a 5% to Campanario, that never operated.
  - As of 2013, Chile has one of the highest energy prices in Latin America and the second highest among mining countries worldwide
  - Although renewable generators were not explicitly excluded, the regime of supply forced them out in practical terms (24-hour supply).



## **Early Auctions**

 Between 2006 & 2015 the results of the auction processed were not promising

 In the 2013 auction, only two generator participated. Two more announced in a local newspaper they were not going

to participate in the auction.

Jueves 21 noviembre de 2013 | Publicado a las 18:41 - Actualizado a las 18:51

Sólo dos empresas se presentan en licitación para generar electricidad para hogares chilenos





#### The Transition

- As a results, the government undertook a reform of the auction system looking to:
  - Add new generation companies
  - Increase competition
  - Lower energy prices
  - Diversity the energy matrix



### The Transition

- Law 20805 in 2015 established key changes in the auction design:
  - Have the government lead the auction process (from the distribution companies)
  - Increase awards to 20-year contracts to accommodate financing
  - Increase time to complete projects to up to 5 year in advance
  - Add the possibility to postpone the project providing reasonable causes
  - Make auction ceiling price more flexible and secret
  - Add blocks for renewable technologies (e.g. from 8 AM to 6 PM).



#### **New Auctions**

In the 2016 auction, the energy offered was 7 times the awards; 22 winning bids out of 84; 2/3 of the awards went to wind and solar technologies; from incumbents only Endesa is awarded; other incumbents get nothing.

Companies	Country	Awards (GWh)		
Mainstream	Ireland	3366		
Endesa	Italy/Spain	5918		
WPD	Germany	786.8		
Ibereólica	Spain	1034.8		
Acciona	Spain	506		
Opde	Spain	176		
Cox Energy	Spain	264		
Solarpack	Spain	280		
Besalco	Chile	10.4		
Aela Energía	Chile	88		
Total		12430		



#### **New Auctions**

 The 2016 prices are quite competitive in general and for RES in particular. Solar marked a World record at \$29.1/MWh. The average price of the awarded bids is \$47.5/MWh.

Prices of winning bids					
Blocks	Average	Max	Min		
1	40.418	43.116	38.077		
2-A	50.545	64.000	43.116		
2-B	41.892	47.472	29.100		
2-C	52.637	73.000	43.116		
3	50.792	55.440	44.053		
Total	47.552	73.000	29.100		



## Research Objetives

 Identify the factors that caused the change from a deficient auction system to a highly successful one

Are those factors endogenous or exogenous?

- to identify, among all the factors, which are the most relevant in the decision from projects to participate in the auctions
- to examine whether the changes favor the development of renewable or conventional energy projects




## Methodology

- The proposed methodology is a Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) tool AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) that evaluates which factors have the highest influence for auction participants and if those factors are endogenous and exogenous.
- AHP technique allows the decision makers to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative judgments into a decision problem, obtaining a ranking for the influence of the factors.



## Methodology





## Methodology

- The key steps involved in this methodology:
  - Structure the decision problem in a hierarchy of levels with goal at the top level followed by criteria.
  - Prepare a questionnaire using pair-wise comparison between each element and assign a numerical value.
  - For each comparison matrix calculate metrics: maximum eigenvalue, consistency index (CI), consistency ratio (CR), and normalized eigenvector to obtain priority weights for each criteria.
  - Integrate the judgments over various levels of hierarchy to produce an overall priority ranking for alternatives.



## **Initial Results**

Criteria	Local Weights	Global weights	Rank	RES energy	Conventional Energy
Endogenous factors					
Length of contracts	0.331	0.264	1	0.132	0.132
Time to build the project	0.206	0.165	2	0.041	0.123
Warranties	0.017	0.014	13	0.011	0.002
State run auction system	0.041	0.033	8	0.028	0.006
Flexibility in contract postponement	0.102	0.082	4	0.041	0.050
Transferability	0.088	0.071	5	0.052	0.018
Time blocks for bidding	0.189	0.151	3	0.136	0.015
Secret ceiling price	0.025	0.020	11	0.010	0.010
Exogenous factors					
High credit ranking of the country	0.027	0.005	15	0.005	0.001
Attractive destination for FDI	0.042	0.008	14	0.007	0.001
Large Renewable potential/ capacity factors	0.250	0.050	7	0.045	0.005
Renewable Portfolio Standard (20/25)	0.088	0.018	12	0.016	0.002
Availability of land	0.145	0.029	9	0.026	0.003
Electricity prices	0.333	0.067	6	0.033	0.033
Fossil fuel prices	0.115	0.023	10	0.003	0.200
Rank				0.586	0.413



#### Discussion

- Initial results shows that changes in design features of the auction scheme contributed in attracting investment, causing at the same time, an increase in competition.
- The results show that the most relevant factors are endogenous factors, including the length of contracts, length of time to build the projects & the hourly blocks.
- In addition, results show that changes favored the entrance of renewables more than conventional projects



#### Discussion

- The very low prices have raised doubts about economic feasibility of awarded projects
- Guarantees pledged are rather insufficient to guarantee the realization of projects
- Other issues may come into play to archive energy matrix objectives:
  - Aging transmission infrastructure and congestion issues
  - Increasing conflict levels with local communities



#### ¿Questions or Comments?

